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Passed to

5 August 1966

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

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SAS/DDS&T:

4 August 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, DDS&T

SUBJECT: Comments on JHRC

1. The primary flaw in the JHRC study is that no cost comparisons nor effectiveness comparisons were made among the three suggested tasking alternatives. Without these comparisons, it would appear hazardous to select a preferred course of action. In short, the study does not contain information appropriate to deriving conclusions and hence is not in fact done.

2. The heavy emphasis on forming COMEX reflects an apparent need to order the data exploitation phase, even though the need to do this is not quantitatively established. If a real need could be established, then expanding COMOR's work would appear to be the preferred course, since the inextricable relationship between collection and exploitation would be preserved, since at present COMOR members are not working full time on COMOR matters, and since COMOR members are probably the most knowledgeable group available with respect to intelligence needs-which needs can be met only by exploitation and collection together and are not met by collection alone.

3. A clear cut separation is not drawn between exploitation resources to support on going peacetime intelligence collection and that which is necessary to be on-the-shelf to support combat or wartime collection. Given this separation

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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
one can then address the question of how much of the peacetime exploitation tasks could and should be properly given to the in-reserve combat exploitation capability without jeopardy to the peacetime mission. The obviously hard to define differences between national and non-national intelligence do not appear to be significant nor useful in studying the exploitation process. It is my feeling that all peacetime intelligence is national and only in a combat situation can one even consider intelligence to be "non-national".

4. There is an implicit assumption permeating the whole study that CIA is organizationally like the Air Force or the Navy, when, in fact, the CIA according to charter and law represents the services as well as all other government agencies and organizations as the supporting staff of the DCI. The result of this misinterpretation of roles and missions is that a potentially strong mechanism for solving the exploitation problem, as well as many other inter-agency problems, is not even considered. In my view, if there is indeed a problem in the exploitation area it reflects on the CIA's failure to perform and carry out its clearly defined duties and responsibilities, and thru this default, the burgeoning and uncontrolled growth of capabilities throughout the government structure which are, at least, tacitly, if not in fact, quite illegal, not to mention duplicatory, wasteful and inefficient.

5. Specific recommendations as to future action are:

a. Remand the JIIRG study back for completion, emphasizing the necessity for cost and effectiveness evaluation of alternatives. Effectiveness should be measured in terms of the expected degree of consumer satisfaction, (quantity, quality, timeliness, detail, etc.).

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
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b. Instruct the inclusion of a tasking alternative involving CIA carrying out its statutory responsibilities.

c. Reformate the study splitting the tasks between peacetime and combat exploitations emphasizing the peacetime exploitation tasks justifying any use of in-reserve combat capability on the basis of output quality, no degradation in effectiveness, and demonstrated needs for training.

d. Re-study the COMOR-COMEX question inserting appropriate COMOR generated inputs in lieu of outsider's estimates of COMOR activities.

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Chief, Systems Analysis Staff  
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